Trump expects the strait to reopen soon and threatens Iran with harsh military action, while Tehran considers a European role in mine-clearing operations and Pakistan reveals its role as a backchannel between the two sides

Monitoring and Analysis | BETH

On Day 155 of the war, the Strait of Hormuz began moving closer to a transition from a battlefield to the negotiating table, but under the shadow of an American military threat that has yet to be withdrawn.

U.S. President Donald Trump said Tuesday that the strait would “reopen very soon,” pointing to ongoing talks with Iran and warning Tehran that it would face “harsh” military action if the negotiations collapsed.

The statement coincided with signs of progress in the talks. Trump later spoke of “very good discussions” with Iran, while oil prices declined amid growing expectations of an understanding that would restore safe navigation through the strait.

Meanwhile, Iran is considering allowing European countries to participate in mine-clearing operations in the Strait of Hormuz, after previously rejecting any foreign involvement in such efforts.

Officials said Tehran had shown greater flexibility during private meetings held in recent weeks and had softened its objection to the participation of external parties. Such a step could provide the technical mechanism needed to reopen the waterway without forcing Iran to announce a direct political retreat.

Reports concerning the Iranian–Omani talks indicate that temporary arrangements to regulate vessel traffic are under consideration. However, disagreements persist over freedom of navigation, the limits of Iran’s role, and Tehran’s demand that reopening the strait be linked to lifting the American blockade on its ports.

In a parallel track, Pakistan’s ambassador to Russia, Faisal Niaz Tirmizi, said Islamabad was conducting undisclosed diplomatic contacts and initiatives to contain the escalation and was serving as a channel of communication between the United States and Iran.

The negotiations are therefore no longer moving through a single mediator. Oman is handling arrangements related to the strait and maritime navigation, Qatar is opening parallel political channels, and Pakistan is working behind the scenes to relay messages and test positions before they are announced.

Analysis

What Has Changed?

The most significant shift is not Trump’s statement, but Iran’s flexibility toward European participation in mine-clearing operations.

Reopening the strait cannot be achieved through a political decision alone. It requires maritime surveys, the identification and removal of mines, the securing of shipping lanes, and clear assurances to vessels and insurance companies that a safe return has become possible.

Iran’s potential acceptance of a European role therefore means that it has begun discussing how to reopen the strait, whereas its previous rhetoric focused on the reasons for its closure and the conditions for retaining it as a source of leverage.

This is a fundamental difference. The negotiations appear to have moved beyond the political question—will Hormuz reopen?—and entered the operational phase: Who will clear the mines? Who will monitor the waterway? And who will guarantee the safety of vessels?

Europe as an Exit Route

The involvement of European countries may not be merely a technical detail, but a carefully designed political exit.

Tehran could portray direct American involvement in mine-clearing operations as the forceful seizure of the strait. A European role, however, would allow Iran to argue that it had agreed to international cooperation for humanitarian and commercial purposes, rather than to an American military operation within its maritime domain.

European participation would also provide Washington with a degree of technical reassurance while sparing it from deploying its own units on a mission that could lead to direct friction with Iranian forces.

Europe would therefore become a middle ground between Iran’s rejection of an American presence and the United States’ refusal to allow Tehran exclusive control over the waterway.

Mine-clearing operations, however, cannot begin in practice without prior mutual guarantees: an end to attacks on vessels, protection for mine-clearance teams, the establishment of a maritime truce, and agreement on the authority responsible for declaring the shipping lanes safe.

The Threat Within the Negotiations

Trump’s statement that Hormuz will reopen soon does not mean the military option has receded. Instead, it shows that Washington is using the threat of force to accelerate the negotiations.

The U.S. president is presenting Tehran with two paths at once: an agreement that reopens the strait, or a harsh strike if the talks collapse.

These are not negotiations taking place after the war has stopped, but negotiations occurring within the war itself. Military operations, the blockade, and threats remain part of the negotiating tools, while each side seeks to improve its position before a final formula is reached.

The American threat, however, carries a countervailing risk. It could push Iran toward a rapid concession, but it could also drive Tehran to harden its position if it believes an agreement would be presented domestically as a surrender under pressure.

Washington is therefore using harsh public language, while mediators work behind the scenes to formulate an outcome that each side can present to its own public as a gain rather than a defeat.

Why Pakistan?

Pakistan’s role provides the negotiations with a channel distinct from Gulf and Omani mediation.

Islamabad maintains relations with Iran while also having political and military ties with the United States. As an Islamic nuclear-armed state, it understands the sensitivity of the nuclear file and the balance between deterrence and international guarantees.

Pakistan may not be the party that delivers the final agreement, but it can convey messages neither side wants to make public, test the limits of acceptable concessions, and warn against miscalculations that could reignite the confrontation.

It is serving as a mediator of messages, while Oman is likely acting as a mediator of arrangements, and Qatar is providing additional space to support a political understanding.

The multiplicity of channels shows that the dispute is no longer confined to a single issue. It encompasses the strait, the maritime blockade, the nuclear program, military strikes, and the security of regional states. Each issue therefore requires a negotiating channel suited to its nature.

Two Agreements, Not One

Current developments point toward a phased formula based on two agreements rather than an immediate comprehensive deal.

The first agreement is urgent. It would address the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, mine clearance, the safe passage of vessels, an end to maritime attacks, and the easing or lifting of the blockade imposed on Iranian ports.

The second agreement would be more difficult. It would cover Iran’s nuclear program, guarantees and inspections, sanctions, and Iran’s military influence in the region.

Washington prefers to resolve the Hormuz issue quickly because of its direct impact on energy prices and the global economy. Iran, however, wants to prevent the issue from being completely separated from the other files, fearing that it could surrender its most important source of leverage before receiving a clear political and economic return.

Expectations

A Gradual, Not Immediate, Reopening

The most likely outcome is an initial understanding to reopen the strait in stages, beginning with designated shipping lanes and priority vessels before normal traffic resumes.

A political agreement may be announced before mine-clearing operations are completed. Shipping and insurance companies, however, will wait until the lanes have been tested and several vessels have passed safely before fully resuming their operations.

The announcement that Hormuz has reopened would therefore not mean that the effects of its closure would end on the same day.

A Limited European Role

Iran is likely to agree to limited and conditional European participation under a technical or international framework, while rejecting any direct American leadership of the operation.

European countries may provide vessels and technical expertise, while Iran and Oman offer the field guarantees necessary for carrying out the mission.

A Maritime Truce First

Before mine-clearing operations begin, an undeclared understanding may emerge to halt attacks on vessels and participating forces and to suspend some American operations against Iranian ports.

This truce would serve as the first test of the two sides’ ability to comply with their commitments before moving toward a broader agreement.

The Nuclear Issue Remains Unresolved

Even if the Strait of Hormuz reopens, this is unlikely to automatically end the war or resolve the nuclear issue.

The strait is the most urgent file, but it is not the most complex. The two sides may succeed in temporarily separating the “rescue of maritime navigation” from the “settlement of the conflict,” while nuclear negotiations continue under mutual military and political pressure.

The Danger of the Final Hours

The period immediately preceding an agreement remains the most dangerous. Actors on the ground may attempt to derail the understanding by attacking a vessel, laying new mines, or carrying out a strike that triggers retaliation.

The success of the negotiations will therefore not be measured by optimistic statements alone, but by their ability to control forces and proxies and prevent the firing of the “final bullet” that could return everyone to the starting point.

Conclusion

On Day 155, the Strait of Hormuz has not yet reopened, but the path toward reopening it has begun to emerge.

Iran’s flexibility toward European participation, the multiplicity of mediation channels, and Trump’s statements about progress in the talks all indicate that the parties are moving closer to discussing operational arrangements rather than general principles alone.

Negotiations, however, are still taking place with weapons present above the table. An agreement may therefore be close, but it remains surrounded by a decisive question:

Will clearing the mines become the beginning of removing the causes of the war, or merely reopen the strait before another round of conflict?